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ADNINISTRA TIVE LAH
Final

E~.;:a mination

January 1958

1. The Tele graphers ~nicn fil~d e ~omplaint Hith the National Ra ilwa:r .Ll. djustment
Board that the X Carrler \Va s vlolatlng a contract between the tvlO bec2l'.se the Carrier 1-128 using SI11i th, a member of the Railway Clerks Union in one of its offices
for a job 1-rhich should go to a member of the Tele graphers Union. The Carrier C'.nS'Hered and s ai d the ar r:;ument was really b etl-men the two Unions and that because
the National Railway Adjustment Act required that notice be given to all parties
involved, due notice should be given to Smith &. the Clerks Union. The Boa.rd refused
to give such notice.
The Carrier nOvI asks the Federal District Court for an injunction against the
Board, requiring them to give notice to Smith & the Clerks Union. The Board claims
th€i t they are not entitled to notice Bnd even if they are entitled to it such notice
need not be given in this case because both Srni th and the CJe rks Union h~d actual
notice. The Board 1 s procedure, however, Bllm·JS only those 1"ho are given formal
notice to be heard.
Are Smith and the Clerks Union entitled to notice and if so is formal notice
necessary?

,

2. The Lumber and Sa1.-rmill Union filed a cOffiyl a int before the H.L.R.B. a~leging that
the X Lumber Company was guilty of unf2,i 1' lc~b o:r practices in that it discharged an
employee for insufficient reasons. A heari:::1g Im s held before an examiner "no issued an intermediate report accompanied by :~inc1in ' s. Tho findin G': s said that the
employee 1vas 1rrongfully dischar:ged and also i.,hat t e COl"l an had" conducted i tself in
a Hay Hhich indicated a general hos tili tv in the DC! st to the Union t s activi-ties.
The Board ado ted the intermediate ren ort as i t s fina l -de-cisio-;-and issued an;rder
directing the company to reinstate the el:lployee and further lito cease and desist
from in any manner interfering '-Jith the :ri~hts of the employees under the National
Labor Il.elations Act. II
The Board :re'1uestGd the Di:strict, Court to eni'orce the order. The X Lumber
Company ans"rered and asked the court to set t he order aside.
1rJhat ground~ liould the company alle ge fer having the order set aside, and how
should the court . rule?

3. Two applications vrere submitted to the Interstate Commerce Commission requesting
a certificate of conven"
a d necessitx to operate a railroad between two named
points. One application ~'ras by the X RailHay and one was b y the Y RailvJay. In the
X Railway application, Y vJaS allm-red to 3nm-Jer as an interested party and in the Y
Railway application, X .vas allm-Jea to anS'IJer as an interested party. The applications were heard before se arate hearin _ exar~,i ne rs. The hearings were substantially
coordinated but not technically consolidated. The examiners made separate reports
to the ICC, but the Commission dealt 'lrJi th b oth ap~)lications in a single report. The
X Reihray application .vas granted but the Y application disal101..ed.
The Y Railway brought an action to have the order of the ICC set aside because
it alleged that evidence appearing in only one record was used to support findings
in both cases. To this allegation the ICC demurred. Judgment for IIDom and why?
On 3 October, Cohen "mo was an ~mpl Qye e of the Textile Company an also an
organizer of theJ.ex±,ile..-..L:.ox r..s. Un" on, passed out applica t ion cards to the entire
n . .workers of the Textile Company. On 4 October, Cohen vJho l'ras then out of town,
called Flanagan, the President of the Company , telling him that he had application
cards from 40 workers and, therefore, he would like to bargain 1fl. th the Company
as the representa tive of' the workers in the plant. Flana gan expressed doubt as to WV'i . ~
the fact that Cohen represented a majority of the workers and refused, after Cohen ylsuggested, to call in the New York Nediation Board to conduct an election. The
~;
Union filed a compalint 'tvith the N.L.R.B. who appointed a beari'Q g examjuer. The
.~ )
examiner took the evidence, including the testimony of FJ.anagan and Cohen, and find- I.-{ ~
ing that Flanagan in "good faith" refus e d to bargain, made an intermediate report
_.• ..P
recommending dismissal of the co
a" t.
___~
---:~{~
- Thu.ul Board re sed th examin ' nd uport findin..g hat Flanagan ~cke<i
~~,J
. "good faIth ) in 1S re us a to ba
", lssued a c~ -n :-a:esls or er against
';..t'''_
'the-PeXf:ile Company. Upon petition to the District Court to enforce the order, the
~~~
Company answered asking tha t the order be set aside.
~_t-'v
Judgment for whom?
( ,~

4.

i

;;.

5.

I

Some refusals of opportunity to be lLezr rely heavily on the idea that hearings are not feasible when a large number of parties may be affected. These cases
stem from Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado which permitted a blanket increase in valua.
tion of aIr-Denver pro-perty without opportunity for taxpayers to be heard. Mr.
~'~~
. Justice Holmes declared for an unanimous Court: IttJhere a rule of conduct applies
"1
...,
Ito more than a few people it is impracticabl e that everyone should have a direct
1c ..voice in its adoption • • • There must be 2. limit to individual argument in such
-~
matters if government is to go on. II The COUl"t distinguished Londoner v. Denver, ~y
~hich required opportunity to be heard ...nere a local board determined II whether,
. ~;. _J _
' In mat amount, and upon whom ll a tax for paving a street should be levied for
~ ..:..'
special benefits, on the ground tha t, "A reletively small number of persons were
. y-i ... ::;., r1
concerned, who were exceptionally affected, in each case upon :individual &:rounds." ·....
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~her

courts, follo'~ng this lea d , ha ve emphasized the n~mber of parties or have
made it the sole criteria.
Requiring a trial in the Londoner case and refusing to require it in the
Bi-Netallic case may h ave been thoroughly sound. But the cases should not be
interpreted as sUPl]Orting the proposition that the requirement of a hearing should
depend upon the number of parties.
\'mat should the proper interpretation bC??

6. The Price Control Ac

--'

. e q., that every wholesaler keep records a.s t (
all sales that he makes; and in ad ition, h e must keep th~e.-r.ec.o~dS-for ;ns.p~
~
by government inspectors. In June of 1958 the O.P.A. issue d a s~na to X re:::
quiring h im 0 appear and to bring his records to a hearing being conducted by the
O.P.A. on a complaint that X has violated the Act. X 1 S attorney asks the hearing
examiner if X is immune from prosecution for any evidence he gives, in light of the
Compulsory Testimony Act vJhich vIi thdraws the privilege a gainst s~ f-incr imi.nation
~ and co
s "fummunit from
osecution up on any person giving evidence in obedience
"
to a subpoena. The examiner replies th8 t -X- fse nti tled to whatever uri' gE-the
Act ~fwrs. X then produces the r e cords and answers qu estions concerning them.
To a question ,.nether he had violated t he Act in any way n o"t! sb mID by t .hed'ecgpis,
X replied that he ~ tiola:t..e.cL.the-Ac.4: };B- <:..fl:9 res ect i n J anua ry of 1958.
The O.P.A. turned over to the Attorney -aeneral s Office the transcript of its
hearing and the Attorney General started 2 prosecution against X for the violation
of the Act in January of 1958 to which he ha d t e . . ed. X claimed immunity from
prosecution under the Compulsory Testimony Act. iiJill he prevail?

7. a) The secretary of Agriculture af ter appro riate hearing, in which Staley
was not a party, issued an order f ixing the standard of identity for sweetened condensed milk. The order requires tha t s li8E tened condense d milk may not contain any
corn syrup, a product produced by St aley. Staley petitions the District Court
asking it to re,¥ieH the order of the Se cretary. The s t atute under .1,fu ~c~ the Secretary acted stated that "any person a dversely affected" may seek Judic1.al review.
The Secretary claims tha t St a ley has no standLng to seel<: judicial revie'w. Is the
Secretary right?

b) The Secretary of Agricultur e after appropria te hearing , in v-Jhich X Cane
Sugar Co. '-Jas not a party , i s sue d an. order ~llO\?-n~ , h~ncefort~, for. canners of
fruit to use dextrose or corn syrup 1.n C 2l!111ng lrU1.t vn.thout dJ.sclos1.ng. ~n t~e
label that cane sugar '!,vas not used.. The :~ COon e Sugar Co. petitions the D1. st:r:1.ct
Court askinp: it to revie1i the Qr.d.,e r of the :::', e cretary. The statute under winch
the Secretary acted is the s ame as in qu esti on 7.a). Does X Cane Sugar Co. have
standing?

./

